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EVIDENCE-ADMISSIONS-EXTRA-JUDICIAL STATE-
MENTS BY AN ADVERSARY WITH AN IDENTIFIABLE
BENEFICIAL INTEREST-Haver v. Hinson, 385 So. 2d 605
(Miss. 1980).
Elizabeth Haver, a minor, brought an action for medical
expenses incurred as the result of injuries caused by the de-
fendant's alleged negligent operation of an automobile.' The
action was brought by and through her parents as Next
Friend.
Immediately prior to the accident, Deborah Haver, the
plaintiff's mother, had been conversing with the defendent in
the front yard.' At the trial, Mrs. Hinson offered testimony
of extra-judicial statements made by Deborah Haver. Those
statements indicated that Mrs. Haver felt that the accident
was not the appellee's fault.' The Mississippi Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court's decision to admit Mrs. Hinson's
1. Haver v. Hinson, 385 So. 2d 605 (Miss. 1980). The suit was brought in the
Circuit Court of Rankin County, Mississippi.
2. 1i at 606-07. Apparently Mrs. Haver did not actually observe the accident.
3. Id. at 608-09. The following is the testimony offered at the trial:
q. Would you state to us what Deborah Haver stated to you upon your
visit during the second hospitalization of Elizabeth?
A. Well, we were in the waiting room and she said, "Well," said, "I
might as well tell you, Jon is going to sue you." She said, "I've been
trying to talk him out of it but I haven't been able to." Said, "I've tried
to tell him that it's not your fault, we were negligent parents and we
should have been watching after our child."
BY MR. MOORE:
Objection your Honor. We would like to approach the bench please.
Whereupon an off the record conference was held at the bench after
which the jury left the courtroom and the following proceedings were
had and done:
BY THE COURT.
I'm going to sustain I think the objection to that part of it which says
" were neligent parnts."
The jury returned to the courtroom and the following proceedings were
had and done:
BY THE COURT.
Ladies and Gentlemen I have sustained the objection that was made
just before you left the courtroom and you are to disregard that part of
the answer concerning any parent's negligence.
BY MR. DALEHITE, continuing-
Q. Mrs. Ainsworth, did you have occasion to talk with Mrs. Haver in
your home sometime around August or September 1977?
A. Yes, sir.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
testimony into evidence despite the fact that the testimony
was clearly hearsay on its face and that it expressed "a con-
clusory opinion having doubtful foundation in the defen-
dant's personal knowledge."' The court held that the testimo-
ny of Mrs. Haver's statements was correctly admitted as
coming under the exception to the hearsay rule allowing the
introduction of extra-judicial admissions by a party oppo-
nent.5
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
A definition of hearsay has never been particularly dif-
ficult for the text writers to propound. McCormick's treatise
gives as concise and as typical definition as any: "Hearsay
evidence is testimony in court, or written evidence, of a state-
ment made out-of-court, the statement being offered as an
assertion to show the truth of the matters therein, and thus
resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court
asserter." The problem for the text writers and the courts
has not been in deciding what is or is not hearsay; the prob-
lem has been in deciding which kinds of hearsay will be ex-
cepted from the general prohibition.7
Q. And would you relate what occurred at that time?
BY MR. MOORE:
We would object, your Honor, for the record.
BY THE COURT'
OVERRULE.
A. She came down to my house and she was very upset and she told me
that Jon had been pressing her into signing this paper to sue me. In
fact I think she hadn't signed it at that time, but she was upset about
it, and she told me it was not my fault, she had been trying to tell Jon
it was not my fault.
4. Id. at 609.
5. I&
6. C. McCORMICK, A HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 246 (2d ed.
1972).
7. Over the years, this has been accomplished through the development of the
well-known "exceptions" to the hearsay rule. See, e.g., D. BINDER, THE HEARSAY
HANDBOOK 35 (1975). As a practical matter, such a list of exceptions is usually
quite satisfactory for the efficient determination of the admissibility of a particular
piece of evidence. As a matter of legal theory, the precise status of a particular piece
of evidence may be open to considerable debate. Admissions constitute a prime ex-
ample of this dichotomy. The court in Haver refers to the fact that the statement in
question is hearsay, but admissible under the exception to the hearsay rule which
allows admissions by a party opponent. As is presently discussed in more detail, the
question of whether admissions are hearsay and come under an exception to the
rule, or are an entirely different brand of evidence, has been the subject of consider-
able debate. For a classic example of handling the status of admissions by simply
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As one author has observed, the rule regarding the ad-
missibility of admissions by a party-opponent forms "the sin-
gle most irrational exception to the hearsay rule."8 A pleth-
ora of legal scholars have offered varying theoretical bases
which have attempted to provide a rigorous framework for
evaluating admissions. An examination of the various view-
points of admissions theory taken by Greenleaf,9 Wigmore,10
Strayhorn," Morgan, 2 the Model Code of Evidence,13 the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence," and the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence,'5 reveals sharp disagreement on the issue of the basis
underlying the acceptance of admissions.
It may be argued that whether or not admissions are
hearsay, and whatever the theoretical basis for their accep-
tance may be, the important factor is that they are admissi-
ble. Such an argument assumes that an admission by a party
has been isolated, underlined and labeled, and merely re-
defining them as not hearsay see FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1). Whichever method of
dealing with the theoretical basis for such evidence is employed, the practical result
is usually the same.
8. Ball, The Changing Shape of the Hearsay Rule, 38 ALA. LAW. 502, 508 (1977).
9. "Such evidence seems, therefore, more properly admissible as a substitute for
the ordinary and legal proof.... The simple and broad rule for receiving them is, in
the language of Chief Barron Pollock, that 'if a party has chosen to talk about a
particular matter, his statement is evidence against himself."' 1 S. GREENLEAF, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 291 (16th ed. 1899).
10. 2 J.WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVI-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 505 (2d ed. 1923). Wigmore takes the position
that, when offered against the party/declarant, admissions do not come under an
exception to the hearsay rule, but exist independently.
11. Strayhorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85 U.
PA. L. REV. 484, 569 (1937). Strayhorn's view is that evidence of an admission by a
party is actually evidence of an affirmative act of that party. As such, he contends,
it should be admitted as would the eyewitness testimony of any other physical act of
the party. This position cleanly avoids becoming involved in the hearsay/non-hear-
say dispute. It does not address the question posed by Hayer of whether or not a
declarant is a party for the purpose of applying the rule.
12. Morgan, Admissions as an Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 30 YALE LJ. 355,
355-56 (1921). Morgan takes issue with Wigmore, arguing that admissions are hear-
say and are admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.
13. Rule 506 (1942). Admissions are included as hearsay but are admissible as
an exception. Note that Professor Morgan was the official reporter.
14. Rule 63 (1953). Admissions are hearsay, but admissible as an exception. It is
interesting to note that the authors of the Uniform Rule have demonstrated the
true spirit of confusion regarding admissions by completely reversing this position
in 1974 with the promulgation of Rule 801 (d). Rule 801 (d) simply redefines admis-
sions as not being hearsay.
15. FED. R. EVID. 801 (d)(1). Admissions are not hearsay.
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quires a decision of what to do with it. Such is not always
the case. When the question arises as to whether a given
statement qualifies as an admission, particularly when the
circumstances surrounding its declaration put it into the
"gray area" of the rule, then a clear understanding of the
rationale behind the rule is vital. This requires an examina-
tion of the basic nature of admissions and the peculiar char-
acteristics which qualify them as being admissible as sub-
stantive evidence in a court of law. Only then is it possible to
fashion a practical set of criteria for determining which
statements actually possess those characteristics and can
therefore be admitted.
An admission is an oral or written statement by a party
to a lawsuit, or attributable to that party, which is inconsis-
tent with a position he is taking in the lawsuit." Within this
broad definition, admissions may be generally broken down
into three basic types: judicial admissions, statements made
during the course of judicial proceedings; 7 extra-judicial ad-
missions by a party, statements made outside of court by a
party to the suit;18 vicarious admissions, statements made by
persons not technically a party to the suit, but which are at-
tributable to a party. 9
16. Technitrol, Inc. v. United States, 440 F. 2d 1362, 1370 (Ct. C1. 1971); Vine St.
Corp. v. City of Council Bluffs, 220 N.W.2d 860, 863, (Iowa 1974); Bolden v. Gatewood,
250 Miss. 93, 118, 164 So. 2d 721, 731 (1964); Hickey v. Anderson, 210 Miss. 455, 463,
49 So. 2d 713, 717 (1951).
17. "A judicial admission is a formal act done in the court of judicial proceed-
ings." Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Ky. 1968). The effect of such an
admission is to waive or dispense with the production of evidence in regards to a
contested fact by conceding that fact as true. Hofer v. Bituminous Cas. Corp., 148
N.W.2d 485 (1967) citing 31A CJ.S. Evidence §§ 299-302 (1964). For a few examples
of acts in Mississippi courts which have been held to constitute judicial admissions
see Huff v. Murray, 171 Miss. 656, 662, 158 So. 475, 477 (1935) (participation by de-
fendant in a trial for unlawful detainer held admission of withholding land from the
plaintiff); Simon v. Desporte, 150 Miss. 673, 679, 116 So. 534, 535 (1928) (signed com-
plaint in a previous case is admissible in a subsequent case as an admission).
18. For a good distinction between judicial admissions and extra judicial admis-
sions see Arnett v. Thompson, 433 S.W.2d 109, 114 (Ky. 1968). See also U.S. for Use
and Benefit of Carter Equip. Co. v. H.R. Morgan, Inc., 544 F. 2d 1271, 1273 (5th Cir.
1977).
19. Vicarious admissions may be binding as the result of several types of rela-
tionships, e.g., Thompson v. A. J. Lyon & Co., 152 Miss. 500, 506 (1874) (agents);
Brown v. McGraw, 20 Miss. (12 S. & M.) 267 (1849) (by predecessor in interest of
assignee of a chose in action or note). For a general discussion of vicarious admis-




Admissions hold a unique position in the field of evi-
dence for the dubious distinction of being admissible in spite
of the absence of a number of otherwise vital evidentiary
qualifications. 20 There is no requirement of first-hand knowl-
edge. 21 There is no prohibition of opinions or conclusions.22
There is no requirement that the declarant be unavailable to
testify.23 There is no requirement that the declarant have
been consciously aware that the statement was against his
interest.2 No foundation need be laid for an admission's in-
troduction. 25 Lastly, an admission is admitted as substantive
proof of the matter asserted therein.26 The reason for this
lack of requirements may be due in part to the fact that ad-
missions by a party were admissible as evidence long before
the crystalization of the hearsay rule.27 Testimony of admis-
sions was historically allowed on the fundamental precept
that a party should not be allowed to question the trustwor-
thiness of his own statements.
28
20. A careful distinction should be made between the question of the admissi-
bility of an admission and the weight it is to be given by the trier of fact once it is
admitted. Other evidence on a particular matter is not precluded by the introduction
of an admission. Reynolds v. McGehee, 220 Miss. 750, 753, 71 So. 2d 780, 782 (1954).
An admission may be explained. Bradshaw v. Stieffel, 230 Miss. 361, 367, 92 So. 2d
565, 567 (1957). Admissions containing conclusions or statements of intentions may
be outweighed and even overborne by superior evidence. Pannell v. Glidewell, 142
Miss. 77, 87-88, 107 So. 273, 275 (1926).
21. Johns v. Cotton, 284 A.2d 50, 52 (D.C. 1971); Matthews v. Carpenter, 231
Miss. 677, 683, 97 So. 2d 522, 524-25 (1957).
22. Owens v. Atchison, Topeka and S.F. R., 393 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1968), cert
denied 393 U.S. 855 (1968); Mallonee v. Finch, 413 P.2d 159, 163 (Alaska 1966); Hick-
ey v. Anderson, 210 Miss. 455, 463, 49 So. 2d 713, 717 (1951); Carpenter v. Davis 435
S.W.2d 382, 384 (Mo. 1968); Black v. Nelson, 246 Or. 161, 165, 424 P.2d 251, 253-54
(1967); Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Barron, 495 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1973).
23. Hunt v. Seaboard Coast Line R., 327 So. 2d 193, 195-96 (Fla. 1976). This
"non-requirement" is only logical since in order to be a party in an action, the court
must have obtained in personam jurisdiction, thus having brought the party into
court.
24. Id.
25. White v. Weitz, 169 Miss. 102, 111, 152 So. 484, 486 (1934).
26. Bolden v. Gatewood, 250 Miss. 93, 118, 164 So. 2d 721, 732 (1964); Reynolds v.
McGehee, 220 Miss. 750, 753. 71 So. 2d 780, 782 (1954).
27. Morgan, Admissions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 181, 182 (1937); Note, 47 GEO. L.J.
560 (1959). According to Wigmore, the hearsay rule began to be articulated in the
1500's and was firmly established in its present form by 1700. 5 WIGMORE ON EVI-
DENCE § 1364 (3rd ed. 1940). See also W. HOLDSWORTH, 9 A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 126-34 (3rd ed. 1944).
28. Note, supra note 27, at 562.
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In view of both the lack of most of the normal assur-
ances of truth and the historical antedating of the hearsay
rule by the use of admissions, the modern theoretical basis
for accepting admissions seems to rest on the adversary sys-
tem of litigation. 9 A party, through his pleadings, takes a
formal position in a court of law that sets forth the interests
he seeks to have litigated as against his opponent. As a di-
rect result of taking this position, his opponent is given the
affirmative right to require an explanation of any prior act
or statement which is contrary to that position.
While the adversary system theory does allow more
flexibility in justifying some of the idiosyncracies inherent in
admissions, it also raises some questions. Why should the ve-
racity of an extra-judicial statement by a party be more in-
herently susceptible of ascertainment by a jury than would
evidence of a witness's prior inconsistent statement?0 At-
tempting to answer such a question graphically illustrates
the countervailing considerations of the inherent probative
worth of a piece of evidence as juxtaposed with the funda-
mental characteristics of litigation rooted in the adversary
system.
The importance of resolving these countervailing consid-
erations becomes evident when the attempt is made to deter-
mine whether a particular statement comes under the admis-
sions exception to the hearsay rule. Specifically, difficulty
can arise in deciding whether or not the declarant of a par-
ticular statement falls within the definition of "party."31 In
the simple situation where A alleges an assault by B and
files suit, there is no difficulty in ascertaining that A and B
29. Felker v. Bartleme, 124 Ill. App. 2d 43, 50-1, 260 N.E.2d 74, 78 (1970); Mor-
gan, Admissions, 12 WASH. L REV. 181, 182 (1937).
30. A prior inconsistent statement is admissible, but only for the purpose of
impeaching a witness. Capitol Constr. Co. v. Tullier, 210 So. 2d 654, 656 (Miss. 1968).
A proper foundation must be laid for its introduction. Kelly v. King, 196 So. 2d 525,
528-29 (Miss. 1967). Thus the witness must be given a chance to deny or to explain
his alleged inconsistency as a precondition to the introduction of the statement as
evidence.
31. "The word party then is unquestionably a technical word, and has a precise
meaning in legal parlance. By it is understood he or they by or against whom a suit
is brought, whether at law or equity, the party plaintiff or defendant, whether com-
posed of one or more individuals, and whether natural or legal persons; they are
parties on the writ, and parties on the record, and all others who may be affected by
the writ indirectly or consequentially are persons interested, but not parties." Mer-
chants Bank v. Cook 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 405, 411 (1826).
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EVIDENCE-ADMISSIONS
are the parties to the action. As a result, an admission by
either is admissible against the declarant. As the number of
persons involved in some aspect of an action increases and
the interrelations become more complex, ascertaining the
parties becomes more difficult. From the perspective of the
adversary system theory of admissions, a "party" is limited
strictly to the person who sets forth his interests in the
pleadings. However, when evaluating the probative value of
an admission, it is the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the making of that admission which gives the
greatest insight into the value of that admission.2
This delineation of the parameters of "party" becomes
particularly important in a suit to recover damages suffered
by an infant as a result of tortious conduct. The central issue
is deciding to whom the interests being litigated belong. Any
tort committed upon an infant creates two specific causes of
action23 One cause of action lies with the parents for medical
expenses and loss of the child's services during minority and
the other lies with the child for those injuries which are per-
sonal in nature."'
The right to recover medical expenses derives from the
parent/child relationship and the parents' resulting duty to
care for and maintain the child. 5 It is more precise to say
that for the most part, the right to recover medical expenses
falls wherever the burden of payment should or does fall.
This has resulted in some varying theories of the right of
action. It has been held that the parents' action is strictly
compensatory in nature and therefore any punitive damages
3"2 Hope v. Evans, 1 (S. & M. Ch.) 195, 204 (Miss. 1843).
33. Wright v. Standard Oil Co., 319 F. Supp. 1364, 1374-75 (N.D. Miss. 1970),
rev'd on other grounds, 470 F.2d 1280, cert. denied, 412 U.S. 938; Hunt v. Yeatman,
264 F. Supp. 490, 491 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (construing Pennsylvania law); Lopez v. Wal-
drun Estate, 249 Ark. 558, 563, 460 S.W.2d 61, 64 (1970); Walten v. City of Flint, 35
Mich. App. 603, 199 N.W.2d 264, 266 (1972); Lane v. Webb, 220 So. 2d 281, 286 (Miss.
1969); Natchez, J. & C. R. v. Cook, 63 Miss. 38, 42, (1885); Emanuel v. Clewis, 272 N.C.
505, 509, 158 S.E.2d 587, 590 (1968); Hughey v. Ausborn, 249 S.C. 470, 475, 154 S.E.2d
839, 841-42 (1967); Savard v. Cody Chev., Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 412, 234 A.2d 656, 661
(1967) quoted in Trapeni v. Walker, 120 Vt. 510, 516, 144 A.2d 831, 835 (1958). For
collected cases on the subject see 37 A.L.R. 64 (1925); 32 A.LR.2d 1060 (1953).
34. Wright, 319 F. Supp. at 1374-75; Emanuel v. Clewis, 272 N.C. 505, 509, 158
S.E.2d 587, 590 (1968).
35. Wright, 319 F. Supp. at 1374-75. See also Matthews v. State, 240 Miss. 189,
193, 126 So. 2d 245, 246 (1961). But see Central of Georgia R. v. McNab, 150 Ala. 332,
43 So. 222 (1907).
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in a suit must go to the child.6 Closely related to this idea is
that if a minor pays his medical bills3 7 or obligates himself to
pay them,3 the minor may collect the expenses incurred. In
one jurisdiction the child may be liable for medical expenses
as necessary expenses and therefore may bring suit in his
own name.39 The right of the parents to damages for loss of
services during minority is derived from either a master/ser-
vant relationship'0 or simply from the parent/child relation-
ship. 1
The second cause of action arises in the infant. This ac-
tion is for personal injuries to the infant such as pain and
suffering, disfigurement, and loss of earnings after major-
ity.
4 2
These two causes of action are separate and distinct,
therefore the bringing of an action by either the parents or
the child for the appropriate damages does not bar the other
from bringing a separate suit.'3 In fact, a verdict for either
the child or the parent does not preclude an opposite verdict
in a separate action by the other on the same set of facts."
Of course, if the parents and the child join their causes of
action in the same suit, different verdicts are precluded.'5
The parents' cause of action is not absolute. It is deriva-
tive in nature' and it may be lost or it may never arise. It
will never arise if the child has been emancipated since the
36. Hughey v. Ausborn, 249 S.C. 470, 475, 154 S.E.2d 839, 841-42 (1967).
37. Smith v. Gulf, M. & N. R., 158 Miss. 188, 193, 129 So. 599, 601 (1930).
38. Savard v. Cody Chev. Inc., 126 Vt. 405, 412, 234 A.2d 656, 661 (1967). But see
Sulkowski v. Shaefer, 31 Wis.2d 600, 604 143 N.W.2d 512, 515-16 (1966) (since an
infant cannot contractually obligate itself, it cannot collect medical expenses).
39. Scott County School Dist. I v. Asker, 324 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Ind. 1975) (by
statute).
40. See Tide v. Skinner, 225 N.Y. 422, 423, 122 N.E. 247, 251 (1919); Central of
Georgia R. v. McNab, 150 Ala. 332, 340, 43 So. 222, 224 (1907).
41. Gulf Ref. Co. v. Miller, 153 Miss. 741, 747, 121 So. 482, 484 (1929). Specifically
this right to services has been seen as a type of reimbursement to the parents for
their parental duty to support the child. Marlar v. Smith, 134 Miss. 76, 83,98 So. 338,
339 (1924).
42. Wright, 319 F. Supp. at 1374-75.
43. Balandran v. Compton, 141 Kan. 321, 322, 41 P.2d 720, 721 (1935); Akers v.
Fulkerson, 153 Ky. 228, 230-31, 154 S.W. 1101, 1102-03 (1913). Contra Hunt v. Yeat-
man, 264 F. Supp. 490, 491 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (by statute requiring all damages litigated
in one suit).
44. Akers v. Fulkerson, 153 Ky. 228, 230-31, 154 S.W. 1101, 1102-03 (1913).




parents of an emancipated child are not responsible for its
care and maintenance, and are not entitled to his services."
The parents' cause of action may be lost through either a for-
mal waiver 8 or through an implied waiver which operates in
favor of the child and estops the parents from maintaining
an action in his own name for damages which were claimed
in the child's suit. 9 This implied waiver and estoppel has
been found when the infant brings suit and the parents ei-
ther know or have reason to know of the existence of the
suit.50 The inaction of the parents has been deemed a waiver
of the parents' cause of action in favor of the infant. In some
jurisdictions the parents' act of testifying in a child's suit for
medical expenses will estop the parents from later claiming
them.5'
The implied waiver of the parents' cause of action is also
found when a parent as next friend of the infant brings an
action which includes damages otherwise belonging to the
parent.52 In such a case, the parent is deemed to have waived
his own cause of action in favor of the child and is estopped
from claiming them in a subsequent suit. 3 The Mississippi
Supreme Court described the effects of such a waiver in Lane
v. Webb.:' "In such a case the parent treats the child as
emancipated in so far as recovery for damages is concerned
47. Anderson v. Jenkins, 220 Miss. 145, 154, 70 So. 2d 535, 539 (1954). See gener-
ally Marlar v. Smith, 134 Miss. 76, 83, 98 So. 338, 339 (1924) (on waiver and emanci-
pation).
48. National City Dev. Co. v. McFerran, 55 A.2d 342, 343 (D.C. 1947); Evans v.
Caldwell, 52 Ga. App. 475, 485, 184 S.E. 440, 446 (1936).
49. Lane v. Webb, 220 So. 2d 281, 286 (Miss. 1969).
50. Vincennes Bridge Co. v. Guinn, 231 Ky. 772, 779, 22 S.W.2d 300, 303 (1929).
This only occurs when the infant brings suit by a next friend other than his parents
and claims damages otherwise belonging to his parents.
51. E.g., Girard v. Irvine, 97 Cal. App. 377, 386, 275 P. 840, 844 (1929).
52. Central of Georgia R. v. McNab, 150 Ala. 332, 340, 43 So. 222, 224 (1907);
Stone v. Yellow Cab Co., 221 P. 2d 131,135 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950); National City
Dev. Co. v. McFerran, 55 A.2d 342, 343 (D.C. 1947); Behemoth Coal Co. v. Helton, 310
Ky. 810, 814, 222 S.W.2d, 845, 847 (1949); Miller v. Trascher, 145 So. 27, 28 (La. Ct.
App. 1932); Lane v. Webb, 220 So. 2d 281, 286 (Miss. 1969); Garrison v. Ryno, 328
S.W.2d 557 (Mo. 1959); Kleibor v. Rogers, 144 S.E.2d 27, 30 (N.C. 1965); Johnson v.
Knipp, 36 Ohio App. 2d 218,220,304 N.E.2d 914,916 (1973); Texas & N.O.R. v. Ozuna,
266 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954).
53. Lane v. Webb, 220 So. 2d 281, 286 (Miss. 1969); Anderson v. Jenkins, 220
Miss. 145, 153-54, 70 So. 2d 535 (1954); Brookhaven Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 132
Miss. 689, 697, 97 So. 484, 485 (1923).
54. Lane v. Webb, 220 So. 2d 281 (Miss. 1969).
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and may not thereafter be permitted to claim that he and not
the child was entitled to recover therefore."55
In Mississippi, an infant is required to bring and defend
suit by "next friend" or "guardian ad litem."56 Technically, a
next friend or prochien ami brings suit for an infant plaintiff
while a guardian ad litem defends a suit for an infant defen-
dent. Other than this there is no real distinction between the
two." The requirement of a next friend or guardian ad litem
has developed as a means of protecting the interests of an
infant, 8 insuring the full and diligent assertion of the rights
of an infant,5 9 and giving the infant standing to sue.60 Thus
the next friend6 is considered to be both a fiduciary to the
55. I& at 286.
56. Notice should be taken of the newly adopted Mississippi Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure provisions (MISS. R. CIV. PRO. 17 (c) and (d)) concerning infants and other
persons under legal disability. The new provisions restate what Mississippi law has
traditionally required for the protection of the interests of such persons. If an in-
fant has a duly appointed legal guardian, the guardian may prosecute or defend on
behalf of the infant. An infant defendant with no duly appointed legal guardian
may have a guardian ad litem appointed by the court. One change instituted by the
new rules is the requirement that a court-appointed guardian ad litem must be an
attorney. An infant may still prosecute an action by his next friend. The indepen-
dent use of the two distinct terms "next friend" and "guardian ad litem" would
seem to indicate that the professional and procedural requirements for a guardian
ad litem do not apply to a next friend. Rule 17 (c) specifically gives the court discre-
tionary authority to make "any other orders it deems proper for the protection of
the interests of the infant." This provision, particularly when coupled with the pro-
visions for a court-appointed attorney to serve as guardian ad litem, raises ques-
tions about the duty and authority of the court in a case such as Haver. In view of
the holding in Haver, as allowing into evidence admissions by the next friend, it
would seem that the protection of the infant's interests in a similar fact situation
would require a court to remove the parents from the role of next friend and ap-
point a guardian/attorney to prosecute the action on behalf of the infant. Such ac-
tion would ensure that the infant's interests in the outcome of the suit could not be
compromised by out-of-court statements of the parent/next friend.
57. Till v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 124 F.2d 405 (10th Cir. 1942);
Clark v. Green, 29 Conn. Supp. 436, 437, 290 A.2d 836, 837 (1971).
58. In re Prine's Estate, 208 So. 2d 187, 192 (Miss. 1968); See also Hunter v.
North Mason H. S., 12 Wash. App. 304, 306-07, 529 P.2d 898,899 (1974) qff'd, 85 Wash.
2d 810, 539 P.2d 845 (1975).
59. In re Prine's Estate, 208 So. 2d 187, 192 (Miss. 1968).
60. Klaus v. State, 54 Miss. 644, 646 (1877).
61. For the purposes of the ensuing discussion, the terms "next friend" and
"guardian ad litem" may be used interchangeably unless otherwise indicated. The




infant 62 and an officer of the court.6 The next friend's con-
duct during the course of litigation is closely scrutinized by
the court, and all of his actions on behalf of the infant are
subject to court approval.64 Accordingly, the next friend may
be removed and replaced by the court at any time.6
Given the dual role of officer of the court and fiduciary
to the infant it is critical to determine the precise status of
the relations between the infant involved in a suit and the
next friend. Who is the real party in the action? It has been
commonly held that it is the infant himself who is the real
party in interest in such an action even though the action is
being conducted through the sui juris of the next friend.
66
The next friend is a party to an infant's suit only as to
procedural matters, 7 since an infant has no procedural ca-
pacity to sue.61 This "procedural party" aspect exists only so
long as the substantive rights of the infant are not im-
paired.69 Thus the infant is the real party in interest. As one
court has observed,
62. Pate v. Perry's Pride, Inc., 348 So. 2d 1038, 1040 (Ala. 1977). In re Prine's
Estate, 208 So. 187, 192 (Miss. 1968).
63. Johnson v. Johnson, 544 P.2d 65, 73-74 (Alaska 1975); Youngblood v. Taylor,
89 So. 2d 503, 505-06 (Fla. 1956); Klaus v. State, 54 Miss. 644, 645-46 (1877); State v.
Ovitt, 128 Vt. 572, 576, 268 A.2d 916, 918 (1970).
64. Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1978); Swoops v.
Swoope, 173 Ala. 157, 163, 55 So. 418, 419 (1911); Phillips v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
347 So. 2d 465, 466 (Fla. App. 1977); In re Prine's Estate, 208 So. 2d 187, 192 (Miss.
1968); Klaus v. State, 54 Miss. 644, 646 (1877); Gallegos v. Clegg, 417 S.W.2d 347, 351-
52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967) ref n.r.e..
65. Klaus v. State, 54 Miss. 644, 646 (1877); Gallegos v. Clegg, 417 S.W.2d 347,
351-52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1967) ref nr.e..
66. Stanczyk v. Keefe, 384 F.2d 707, 708 (7th Cir. 1967); Crowder v. Gordon
Transports, 264 F. Supp. 137, 143 (W.D. Ark. 1967), revd on other grounds 387 F.2d
413 (1967), on remand 289 F. Supp. 166 (1968), rev'd on other grounds 419 F.2d 480
(1969); J. v. Superior Ct. of L.A. County, 4 Cal. 3rd 836, 840, 484 P.2d 595, 598 (1971);
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Hahn, 241 A.2d 517, 521 (Del. 1968); Johnson v. McCabe, 42
Miss. 255, 260 (1868); King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 357, 200 S.E.2d 799, 805-06
(1973); Quenn v. Jolley, 219 Tenn. 427, 431, 410 S.W.2d 416, 418 (1966). The distinction
between the infant and the next friend is sufficient to avoid a charge of res judicata.
Irwin v. Alabama Fuel and Iron Co., 215 Ala. 328, 332, 110 So. 566, 569 (1926); Akers
v. Fulkerson, 153 Ky. 228, 230-31, 154 S.W. 1101, 1102-03 (1913).
67. See Irwin v. Alabama Fuel and Iron Co., 215 Ala. 328, 332, 110 So. 566, 569
(1926).
68. Lopez v. Buras, 321 So. 2d 792, 794 (La. 1975); Burrus v. Burrus, 56 Miss. 92,
98 (1878).
69. This is seen in the fundamental precept that judicial admissions by a next
friend or guardian ad litem are not binding on an infant. Ingersall v. Ingersall, 42
Miss. 155, 163 (1868); Reasoner v. State, 463 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
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[tihe next friend may be regarded as a party for some purposes. He is
liable for costs of suit. He acts for the infant in the employment of
an attorney, and, subject to direction of the court, in the manage-
ment of the cause. But he has no interest in the subject matter nor in
the recovery. The infant is the real party to the suit; his rights are
the rights litigated, and the recovery belongs to him."'
INSTANT CASE
The Mississippi Supreme Court, in analyzing the testi-
mony in Haver observed that the testimony of Mrs. Haver
was clearly hearsay on its face and as such could not be ad-
mitted into evidence unless it came under an exception to the
hearsay rule.71 The court noted that the statement was con-
clusory and was probably completely outside Mrs. Haver's
first-hand knowledge.72 It should be observed at this point
that both of these characteristics would preclude the admis-
sibility of the testimony as substantive evidence on any basis
other than as an admission by a party-opponent. 73 With this
realization, the court was faced with the question as to
whether the parent's status as next friend qualified her as a
''party" for the purposes of the admission exception to the
hearsay rule.
In Mississippi Central Railroad v. Pillows,7' the court was
confronted with an almost identical question. In that case, a
minor fell (or was pushed) from the platform of a moving
train resulting in the severing of his leg. The infant brought
an action by his father as next friend. At trial, the defendant
offered testimony of a statement by the father that he had
purchased the boy's ticket after the accident occurred, thus
establishing the boy's status as that of a trespasser rather
than a passenger/invitee. The court in Pillows approved the
rejection of such testimony, noting that the father as next
friend was "a mere nominal plaintiff having no interest in
the suit."7
1971). Neither may the guardian ad litem submit the rights of the infant to binding
arbitration or compromise. Muncrief v. Green, 251 Ark. 580, 582-83, 473 S.W.2d 907,
908-09 (1971); Fort v. Battle, 21 Miss. (13 S. & M.) 133, 136 (1849).
70. Irwin v. Alabama Fuel and Iron Co., 215 Ala. 328, 332, 110 So. 566, 569
(1926).
71. 385 So. 2d at 609.
72. 1&
73. See notes 20-26 supra and accompanying text.
74. 101 Miss. 527, 58 So. 483 (1912).
75. Id. at 485.
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There was no mention in Pillows of the specific type of
damages the $1000 was intended to represent (i.e., medical
expenses, loss of services, personal injury, etc.). The Haver
court seized upon this point to distinguish the holding in Ha-
ver from that in Pillows. The present case, reasoned the
court, was a suit for medical expenses, the ultimate legal li-
ability for which lies with the parents. 6 This delineation of
rights of action between parent and child was set forth in
Lane v. Webb."
In order to implement the distinction between the types
of damages sought in Pillows and those in Haver, as such
distinction impacts on the admissions exception to the hear-
say rule, the court adopted a new test: the identifiable bene-
ficial interest test.78 The four criteria which apparently must
be met to pass muster under this test are 1) an out of court
statement 2) by the parents 3) suing as next friend 4) in a
suit for medical expenses. Satisfaction of all four criteria will
allow such testimony to be admitted as substantive evidence
as "an admission by an adversary having an identifiable
beneficial interest in the suit.
' 79
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Analysis of the court's handling of the testimony in
question requires examination from three perspectives. First,
one must analyze the reasoning utilized by the court in defin-
ing the status of the parents as parties based on their inter-
est in the suit. Then, one must examine the potential import
of the court's decision to future cases. Finally, one must
weigh the ultimate purpose of the rules of evidence against
the rules regarding admissions, and the theoretical basis uti-
lized in justifying the admission of this particular evidence.
In examining the court's definition of the Havers' status
as parties" to the suit, one begins by analyzing the exact na-
76. 385 So. 2d at 609.
77. 220 So. 2d 281, 285-86 (1969).
78. 385 So. 2d at 609.
79. Id.
80. It should be noted that the court never clearly refers to Mrs. Haver as a
"party", but rather as an "adversary." 385 So. 2d at 609. However, the court specifi-
cally states that the only way the statement can come into evidence is by way of the
"party-opponent admission exception." Id. Since the court did allow the statement
into evidence, it would seem that they have defined "party" as an adversary with an
identifiable beneficial interest.
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ture of their interest in the subject matter of the litigation.
The right to bring an action for medical expenses was indeed
their right. From one point of view, they would be the ones
whom the doctor and hospital would bill. In actuality, they
have no cause of action themselves, having waived it in favor
of their child. The court in Lane defined the nature of the
parents' interest in a case such as this by considering the
child as being emancipated from the parents with regard to
the medical expenses.8 1 In Anderson v. Jenkins2 the court in-
dicated that whoever actually pays or agrees to pay a plain-
tiff's medical expenses has no bearing on the ultimate ques-
tion of the right of the plaintiff to recover. 3 This holding,
when coupled with the fact that in a tort action by an infant,
the next friend has no property interest in the outcome,"4
would seem without question to prevent the parents from be-
ing a party for the purposes of the exception.
The court sets forth the idea of an adversary with an
identifiable beneficial interest as an attempt to circumvent
the precise nature of the term "party"" while retaining the
basic characteristics of the adversary system as they relate
to admissions. This expansion of the rule regarding admis-
sions by use of the identifiable beneficial interest test would
seem to present problems in its applications in future cases.
It is quite possible to envision a case similar to Haver with
the only difference being that the damages sought are for
pain, suffering and disfigurement as opposed to medical ex-
penses. As previously discussed" the damages in such a case
are purely the property rights of an infant. The court's lan-
guage in Haver seems to indicate that in such a case, testi-
mony of Mrs. Haver's statement would not be admissible. 7 It
seems ludicrous to determine the admissibility of a given
piece of evidence based on whether the infant is seeking
medical expenses as opposed to damages for pain and suffer-
ing. In other words, it is difficult to understand how the in-
herent probative value of the testimony, by the same person,
81. 220 So. 2d at 286.
82. 220 Miss. 145, 70 So. 2d 535 (1954).
83. Id. at 154, 70 So. 2d at 539.
84. 215 Ala. 328, 332, 110 So. 566, 569 (1926).
85. See note 31 supra for a precise definition of the word 'party."
86. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
87. 385 So. 2d at 609.
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about the same events, can be significantly altered by the
type of damages the plaintiff is seeking.
On the other hand, had the court excluded the parent's
statement as not having been made by a party, an equally
untenable result would have confronted the court. The par-
ents of a child who has suffered such an injury could exclude
potentially damaging testimony by bringing suit in the
child's name, thus waiving the parent's own claims.88 By lit-
erally defining the parents out of the suit by the form in
which the action is brought, such testimony could be totally
excluded as substantive evidence regardless of its truthful-
ness or probative value.
The court is faced with another potential problem de-
rived from the criteria set forth in their new test. The exis-
tence of a beneficial interest on the part of a parent is in no
way related to his duties and obligations in his role as a next
friend to the infant. If the parent's role as next friend is
critical to satisfying the test the court has set up, another
procedural device for excluding testimony may be employed.
Securing the services of a third party to serve as next friend
in place of a parent/declarant will defeat the test and ex-
clude the evidence. Once again, the inherent probative worth
of the evidence is not the determining factor in its admission
or exclusion.
In the search for an acceptable pathway out of these di-
lemmas, it is necessary to return to the primary function of
rules of evidence and, where necessary, re-evaluate the rules
in light of this function. The purpose of a trier of fact is to
sift through conflicting versions, facts, and perspectives and
to arrive at the truth of a situation." The primary function
of the rules of evidence is to guide the trier of fact by screen-
ing from it evidence which is likely to get in the way of as-
certaining the truth.90
If this premise is accepted as the cornerstone of a theo-
retical framework for determining the admissibility of evi-
88. Cf. Reeves v. Eckles, 108 Ill. App. 2d 427, 429, 248 N.E.2d 125, 127 (1969) (a
waiver of such claims of the parent in favor of the child could have defeated a de-
fense of contributory negligence).
89. '"ruth is the object of all trials." Guy v. Hall, 7 N.C. (3 Mur.) 150, 151
(1819).
90. See Woodward v. U.S., 185 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1950) rev'd on other
grounds 341 U.S. 112 (1951). See generaily HOLDSWORTH, supra note 27.
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dence, the fallacy of the technique the court utilized to admit
the statement becomes apparent. In essence, the court has
sought to bring the testimony into evidence by expanding the
definition of "party." Unfortunately, by choosing this route
and admitting the testimony based on the status of the de-
clarant, the evidentiary safeguards" ensuring the evidence's
probative value have fallen by the wayside. In addition, the
court has defined this expanded version of "party" by use of
the identifiable beneficial interest test in such a way as to
preclude the use of potentially valuable evidence by strategi-
cally structuring damage claims.
Rather than admitting the testimony of Mrs. Haver's
statements based on the status of the declarant, admissibil-
ity should be based on the nature and context of the state-
ment itself allowing, within the discretion of the trial judge,
the presentation of all the circumstances and factors which
enhance or debase its probative value. The most natural way
of accomplishing this would be to allow the statement 2 to be
admitted as a prior inconsistent statement of a witness. As
such, the declarant first would have opportunity to admit,
explain or deny the statement. Likewise, its probative worth
may be explored on the witness stand in regard to qualities
of first hand knowledge, opinion, etc. The jury would be in
the position of observing the courtroom demeanor of each
witness and evaluating conflicting statements in light of all
the evidence.
The principal difficulty with such an approach is the
traditional view that evidence of a witness's prior inconsis-
tent statements is admissible only for impeachment purposes
and not as substantive proof of the matter asserted.13 This
view is supported by the bulk of the case law,94 yet it is not
without formidable opposition. Both the Model Code of Evi-
dence95 and the California Code of Evidence 96 have taken the
viewpoint that evidence of such prior inconsistent statements
91. Such as the opinion rule, the requirement of first hand knowledge, etc.
92. 385 So. 2d at 608-09.
93. Magee v. Magee, 320 So. 2d 779, 783 (Miss. 1975).
94. See generaily C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 251
(2d ed. 1972).
95. Rule 503 (b).




may be admitted as substantive evidence. The Federal Rules
of Evidence allow some specific types of prior statements
97
and, while not explicitly allowing all such statements to be
admissible, does leave great leeway within the discretion of
the trial judge. 8
From a purely practical point of view, it makes very lit-
tle difference whether one terms evidence of a prior inconsis-
tent statement as substantive or merely impeaching. As
Judge Learned Hand once observed:
The possibility that the jury may accept as the truth the earlier
statements in preference to those made upon the stand is indeed real,
but we find no difficulty in it. If, from all that the jury sees of the
witness, they conclude that what he says is not the truth, but what
he said before, they are nonetheless deciding from what they see and
hear of that person and in court. There is no mythical necessity that
the case be decided only in accordance with the truth of words ut-
tered under oath in court."
Allowing testimony of Mrs. Haver's statement to be con-
sidered under a rule allowing evidence of certain prior incon-
sistent statements as substantive evidence would allow the
judge to make an initial determination of the probative value
of the statement. If it did have such value, the jury could
then determine the basic truthfulness of the testimony and
the weight it should be given. More importantly in an action
for either the parent's damages or the infant's damages, the
factor determining the statement's admissibility is the state-
ment itself as measured against the fundamental tests for
truthfulness, not a technical definition of the declarant.
Nicholas Van Wiser
97. Rule § 801 (d) (1). See also Advisory Committee's Note to § 801.
98. Id See also Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 290-95 (7th Cir. 1979)
for an excellent discussion of the residual hearsay exception and the trial judge's
role in its application.
99. DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1925).
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